Nationalism and the State

One of the great difficulties that scholars face in discussions about the concept of nation is its unclear meaning. An unambiguous answer to the question “what is the nation?” is not easy to provide. This is primarily due to the fact that often the term nation is used indistinguishably to refer to two very different concepts. ‘At times it connotes identification with and loyalty to the nation in the sense of a human grouping which may or may not be essentially coterminous with a state (e.g., Croatian, Fleming, Scottish, or Ukrainian nationalism). More often it is used to connote identification with and loyalty to the “nation” when the latter is used to indicate the state structure regardless of the national composition of the state’s population (e.g., American, Argentinian, Indian, or Filipino Nationalism).’ (Connor, 2004, p.24)
In continuation, I shall criticize the first form, which Walker Connor has named ethnonationalism, which does not imply that I shall be criticizing the second form, which Connor referred to as Patriotism. (2004)
I shall attempt to prove that an ethnocentric theory of society cannot sustain rigorous scrutiny. I shall argue that history has proved over and over again that ethnonationalism is extremely destructive, and that political systems founded on its premises often lead to horrible atrocities and other negative consequences that are extremely undesirable. I sustain that a good theory of the state should accept patriotism, but vigorously refuse ethnonationalism. Thus, the principles that a state cannot have more than one nation in it, and that each nation must have it own state should be rejected.
The peril of associating the state with the nation is real and grave, and this has been clearly demonstrated by the historical events that took place in the 20th century. This is especially true when it is considered that the state must not have in it more than one nation. If a certain state corresponds to one nation alone than the members of other nations will inevitably be excluded. This leads to the exclusion of the people that do not correspond to the privileged nation within the state, which can range from measures like denying them some rights by law, discriminating them because of their nationality (understood in ethnic, not state terms), persecute them, expel them form the territory of the state or exterminate them physically.
A number of examples can be drawn from real life to illustrate this: the identification of the German state with the German nation and the following exclusion of Jews and Gipsies during Nazi rule; the identification of the Sudanese state with the Arabs in Sudan and the consequential exclusion of African Sudanese tribes which led to conflicts in Southern and Western Sudan; the identification of the South African state with white settlers and the exclusion of black people, which led to the Apartheid regime; the identification of the Rwandan state with Hutus, which led to the exclusion of Tutsis and culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide; the identification of the Australian state with European settlers and the exclusion of the Australian aborigines; the identification of the Chinese state with Han Chinese and the oppression of non-Han Chinese within the Chinese state; etc...
This list could be extended almost indefinitely and constitutes a powerful proof of how states that are identified with a nation often end in disaster, provoked by the inevitable exclusion of the people that are not members of the privileged nation and live within the state. This leads me to believe that an adequate theory of the state should reject the temptation to link state and nation.
Of course, the nationalist can argue that strife between nations is both natural and inevitable, and that a nation has the right to exclude other nations from the state it possesses. In order to prove the soundness of this claim, however, the nationalist must be able to prove that: 1) the world is divided in several nations which are independent, well-delimited and well-defined entities; 2) those nations cannot live together and thus must live in separate states and; 3) that if two nations share the same state, either they should split the state into two parts, one for each nation, or one nation should exclude the other and become the dominant or sole nation in that state. In practice, the nationalist must prove that it is indeed necessary that every state correspond to one specific nation.
Previously we have seen that to identify a state with a specific nation is undesirable, since it often leads to pernicious results. Next we shall see that, unlike what the nationalist wants us to believe, it is not necessary for a state to represent a specific nation, or for every nation to have its own state.
First, it is worth thinking about the notion that the world is divided into independent, well delimited and well defined entities. Often the nationalist will defend the claim that his nation is clear-cut different from all the others. However, this is seldom confirmed by factual evidence. In fact, it is often the case that it is rather hard to establish accurately who the members of a nation are. A good example of this is the ethnic confrontation between Hutus and Tutsis that led to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In that particular episode, the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government, with the help of the Hutu civilian population, exterminated nearly the entire Tutsi population as the result of ethnic tensions as well as complicated political and economic dynamics in the country during that period. Yet, a careful analysis of Rwandan history suggests that the categories Hutu and Tutsi, as they are perceived now, are largely the product of colonial administration, and are therefore artificial labels given by the Belgian colonizers to the native Rwandans. In other words, the natural division of the Rwandan population in two races, Hutus and Tutsis, is largely a fiction created by the Belgian colonizers more than it is a natural historical fact. Moreover, evidence from the 1994 Rwandan genocide suggests that often Hutus were killed because they were identified as Tutsis. This is due to the fact that, without looking at someone’s ID, it is almost impossible to distinguish Hutus from Tutsis since despite being allegedly racially different they are in fact indistinguishable physically. The Rwandan example shows us how often ethnic/national divisions are the product of inaccurate historical facts, and that it is often hard to establish with exactitude who exactly are the members of a nation. By establishing that nations are often the product of a deficient understanding of historical, political and social facts, and that its membership is hard to define, we seriously undermine the argument that nations are natural entities which we cannot dispose of. If we conceive nations as artificial constructs, product of a deficient understanding of history, whose membership is difficult to define with exactitude, than there seems to be no evident reason why nations are not something that can be disposed of if needed be.
There is yet another reason that might make us doubt that the world is naturally divided into well defined and distinct nations. Let us consider the following example. Someone who is from London can rightfully claim that he is a part of the English nation. However, he is also a part of the British nation, of which England is a part. Furthermore, he is also a part of a larger cultural entity, made up of the English-speaking countries in the world, who share the same language and a remarkably similar culture. Someone could even argue that England is a part of the European family of nations, and of the even larger western world. This structure hardly indicates a world structure of very different, independent nations. It rather suggests that reality is comprised of a series of groups that are part of even larger groups, that in turn are part of even larger groups, which are in turn part of the ultimate group: humanity. This structure suggests that there are several groups, distributed in different levels, which are all related at one level or another. It also suggests that even a group like England, is probably divided into several small groups, such as northern and southern England and the several counties. Hence humanity seems to be structured in groups, but these groups do not seem independent from each other. On the contrary, they are apparently related, which means that there are several levels of identification that might rival for the primary recognition as “the nation”, which is often but not always attributed to the state.
This seems to be at odds with the nationalist assumption that each nation must have its own state. If each nation is divided into a series of sub-groups with the potential to become nations themselves, then statehood will always be claimed by some sub-groups which will lead to confrontation with the state they are a part of. But if the world is composed by a series of groups which are not independent, but part of other bigger groups, the claim that each group should have its own state can hardly be sustained. In fact, in accordance to the spiral nature of group division of the world, one should expect to find a myriad of groups, sub-groups, sub-sub-sub groups and so on, living in the same state. Thus, it does not seem necessary that each nation correspond to one state.
What then is the alternative to the uni-national state? The obvious answer is the multi-national state, but the multi-national state also has serious deficiencies. In the first place, in order to avoid the problems that a uni-national state poses, the multi-national state must give equal treatment to all nations, and thus avoid the oppression of smaller nations by a dominant one. However, this is often not the case in multi-national states, where one nation usually emerges as dominant (e.g., Serbia in Yugoslavia, England in the UK, Arabs in Sudan, Russians in the U.S.S.R., Anglophones in Canada, etc...) Even in the cases where a certain stability is deemed to have been achieved for a long period of time in a multi-national state, usually separatist tendencies emerge or re-emerge at some point, like the case of Scotland in the UK, the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain or, most dramatically, the break-up of Yugoslavia into several republics in the early nineties. Hence it is evident that the record of multi-national states is too poor to recommend it as a formula for institutional stability.
Should we then reconsider the option of the uni-national state, even in spite of all of its problems? That would be, I believe, a mistake. A better option is to look further for a form of state that avoids the nuisances of the uni-national state, but is not as unstable as most multi-national states are. I shall call this brand of state the non-national state. It is a kind of state that is not associated with any nation. It is only divided in the individuals that are part of it, the sum of all of them forming the state. The state is seen as a strictly political entity, rather than the instrument of a specific nation or of a multitude of different nations. All the citizens of the state are linked by their connection to the state, but are unique in their personal history, race, culture, religion and even, at times, language. A non-national state avoids the problems that nations create, and as such provides a better model than uni-national and multi-national states.
One factor that could apparently be problematic is language. After all, the state must be either unilingual or multi-lingual. If it is unilingual, one language will become dominant, and speakers of other languages will feel oppressed. On the other hand, if a state is multilingual, divisions between linguistic groups will be preserved, allowing the growth of nationalist feelings. Either way, it seems, different languages create problems and obstruct the creation of a non-national state. A possible solution for this would be to agree on a common language, different from the ones in conflict. Another option is to use several languages, instead of just one, as the administrative languages.
I have argued here that we should reject the principle that each state must correspond to a nation, and that each nation must have its own state. The principle of identification between state and nation leads to problems of both state oppression and separatism. A better model is a non-national state, where the principle of identification between state and nation is rejected.
Nations, as differentiated groups of people with one or more characteristics in common will always exist. However, there is no logical reason why the nation should be the leading unit in the formation of political groups. In fact, as we have seen, to associate nations with states is neither desirable nor necessary. A better course of action is to use nations as elements of personal identification, independent of the states which should act independently as elements of political organization. We can call this the principle of division between state and nation.